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Abstract 
Improving cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination 
is central to the new European Agenda on Migration, launched by the 
European Commission in response to the “refugee crisis” of 2015. The new 
EU Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa finances projects in twenty-six African 
countries. Although initially conceived as a temporary emergency response, 
it has the potential to become a regular component of the EU’s external 
migration policy, and can serve as a model for the systematic integration of 
the EU’s migration interests into its external policy. 
However ideas diverge concerning the Fund’s priorities. Internally, there 
is political pressure for the EU to concentrate on cooperation with transit 
countries in order to further reduce irregular migration to Europe. But 
narrowing the Fund’s remit in that manner would be incompatible with 
the objectives of the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees, which 
the United Nations adopted in December 2018. 
The German government should advocate for a comprehensive approach 
encompassing long-term support for countries of origin and destination. 
In order to improve the coherence of the EU’s external migration policy, the 
vague goals of the EUTF need to be concretised and broken down into real-
istic sub-goals. Migration policy can only have sustainable effects if measures 
are embedded in a broader development agenda and take adequate consid-
eration of the interests of African partner countries. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
From Exception to Rule – 
the EU Trust Fund for Africa 
The increase in refugee and migration movements 
into the European Union since 2015 has revealed 
deficits in the common migration and asylum policy. 
But political responses have been ambivalent. Little 
has been achieved in relation to internal cooperation 
between member states, especially with regard to 
sharing the responsibility for a functioning Common 
European Asylum System. The external dimension, 
on the other hand, has witnessed dynamic develop-
ments in the scope of the European Agenda on Migra-
tion adopted in 2015. 
One important part of the Agenda relates to the 
EU’s cooperation with countries of origin, transit and 
destination, which has not to date been terribly 
successful. To improve matters, the November 2015 
Valletta summit of African and European leaders 
created a new instrument, the European Union Emer-
gency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa. It currently pro-
vides €4 billion for cooperation with twenty-six Afri-
can countries over a period of five years; €3.2 billion 
had already been committed to projects by August 
2018. Under the Valletta Action Plan the funds serve 
to stabilise the partner countries and ameliorate the 
structural causes of irregular migration and forced 
displacement. Migration partnerships with five Afri-
can countries were agreed in June 2016, with these 
countries first in line to benefit from the EUTF as an 
incentive for cooperation. For the first time in this 
context, the initiative also includes sanctions, such as 
suspending projects, in order to encourage partner 
countries to cooperate, for example in readmitting 
rejected asylum seekers. 
From the perspective of the European Commission 
the Trust Fund offers a good model for future deal-
ings with highly differentiated refugee and migration 
challenges in the African countries of origin, transit 
and destination. The Trust Fund structure permits 
the Commission to respond rapidly and flexibly to 
highly dynamic migration flows. Previously separate 
EU funding lines for external relations, home affairs, 
development cooperation humanitarian aid and 
neighbourhood policy are now brought together in 
a single instrument for the first time. 
Issues and Recommendations 
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An interim stocktaking after the first two and a 
half years shows that the EUTF has been able to 
improve both coordination among EU institutions 
and their collaboration with the member states. The 
substantive contribution of the Trust Fund is harder 
to assess, given that diverging priorities have been 
applied in practice. Most of the funded development 
projects have been in countries of origin and desti-
nation south of the Sahara and in the Horn of Africa, 
while a second set seek to improve migration manage-
ment in transit countries like Libya and Niger. The 
latter also include security-related measures such as 
equipment and training for the Libyan coastguard.  
As the largest contributor Germany possesses a 
special interest in the functioning of the EUTF. There 
are, however, different ideas within the German 
government about where it should be going. Domestic 
political considerations generate demands to concen-
trate on clamping down on irregular migration. But 
narrowing the focus in that way would represent a 
turn away from the comprehensive approach that is 
vital from the foreign policy and development per-
spective. The German government should therefore 
agree on a cross-ministerial strategy encompassing 
long-term support for African countries of origin and 
destination, and the involved ministries should work 
closely together in shaping the fund. 
Similar controversies over the future of the EUTF 
also characterise the debates at EU level. The negotia-
tions about the next Multi-annual Financial Frame-
work, for example, involve a discussion about which 
Directorate General should coordinate migration 
cooperation with third countries and administer the 
associated funds. It is also unclear how the EU will 
relate to the United Nations Global Compacts for 
Migration and Refugees, which lay down markers that 
will need to be taken into consideration in shaping 
the EUTF and the EU’s future external migration 
policy. The same also applies to the current negotia-
tions on future cooperation between the EU and 
Africa and a successor to the Cotonou Agreement. 
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The basic outlines of the European Unions powers on 
asylum, migration and border policy date back to the 
1990s. In its European Agenda on Migration of 2015 
the Commission proposed new measures designed to 
lead to a “coherent and comprehensive approach”.1 
But its legal possibilities in this field remain limited 
and little progress has been seen on the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS). In this situation, 
the Commission is seeking to expand its influence 
into the sphere of cooperation with third countries. 
Its success here has been limited to date, because 
support from the member states has been weak and 
the EU funding structures lack coherence. The EU 
Trust Fund for Africa stands for a new approach de-
signed to address these problems. 
Incomplete Harmonisation of 
EU Migration Policy 
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 brought most of 
the pre-existing European cooperation on justice and 
home affairs into the Community framework. This 
also included border protection, asylum and migra-
tion policy. While the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon again 
strengthened the EU’s position, the common policy 
still only covers certain areas, while intergovernmen-
tal cooperation continues to predominate in many 
others.2 For example, the member states retain full 
control over immigration numbers; the Union is 
responsible only for harmonisation, with the power 
 
1 European Commission, A European Agenda on Migration, 
COM(2015) 240 final (Brussels, 13 May 2015), https://ec. 
europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/commu 
nication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf. 
2 European Parliament, Division of Competences between the 
European Union and its Member States Concerning Immigration, 
note (Brussels, 2011), 15, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/453178/IPOL-LIBE_NT(2011) 
453178_EN.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). 
to issue directives to ensure minimum standards in 
visa policy and the treatment of third-country citi-
zens.3 The Treaty of Lisbon also empowered the Com-
mission to conclude readmission agreements.4 
Member states agree to reduce 
arrivals but are unable to reform the 
Dublin system. 
In the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the 
Commission also announced reforms of the Common 
European Asylum System. The Union has largely 
assumed responsibility for norm-setting in this area, 
but implementation remains a matter for the member 
states. Although the CEAS was completed in 2013 
the directives harmonising protections and reception 
standards for asylum-seekers have not actually been 
implemented in full.5 In 2016 the European Commis-
 
3 Different directives govern treatment of third-country 
citizens depending on whether they arrive in the EU for 
work, for family reunion, to conduct research, or for a long-
term stay. Sergio Carrera et al., eds., Pathways towards Legal 
Migration into the EU: Reappraising Concepts, Trajectories and 
Policies (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies [CEPS], 
2017). 
4 In fact the EU concluded bilateral readmission agree-
ments even before the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect. That 
power is explicitly underlined in article 79 (3) TFEU. Seven-
teen readmission agreements have been nefotiated, primari-
ly with members of the Eastern Partnership. European 
Parliament, Division of Competences (see note 2). 
5 The CEAS currently comprises five basic elements: the 
Reception Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive, the 
Qualification Directive, the Dublin Regulation and the Euro-
dac Regulation. The directives define minimum standards 
for receiving and caring for asylum-seekers, processing 
asylum applications and granting refugee status. The regu-
lations govern responsibility for asylum processes and 
identification of asylum-seekers and third-country citizens. 
The Fundaments of the EU’s 
External Migration Policy 
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sion presented proposals for rectifying these deficits.6 
Although numbers of new refugees and migrants 
have fallen again,7 the member states remain unable 
to agree on a reform of the Dublin system that in-
cludes a mechanism for sharing the responsibility for 
accepting refugees. There is however a consensus that 
the numbers of refugees and irregular migrants need 
to be reduced, specifically through targeted coopera-
tion with third countries. 
Externalising Migration Policy as Political 
Expedient 
In view of its lack of direct influence the Commission 
drew up its first political framework for cooperation 
with third countries: the 2005 Global Approach to 
Migration.8 This was developed into the Global Ap-
proach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of 2012,9 
which comprises four sets of objectives regarded as 
having equal importance: (1) promoting and improv-
ing the organisation of legal migration, (2) preventing 
and reducing irregular migration, including by com-
 
6 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council: Establishing a Common 
Procedure for International Protection in the Union and Repealing 
Directive 2013/32/EU, COM(2016) 467 final (Brussels, 13 July 
2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2c404 
d27-4a96-11e6-9c64-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format= 
PDF (accessed 19 April 2018); European Commission, Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or State-
less Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection (...), COM 
(2016) 466 final (Brussels, 13 July 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-466-EN-F1-1.PDF 
(accessed 19 April 2018). 
7 After more than one million refugees and migrants 
arrived in the EU in 2015, the number fell to just under 
400,000 in 2016, and to 200,000 in 2017. Frontex – Euro-
pean Border and Coast Guard Agency, Risk Analysis for 2018 
(Warsaw, February 2018), http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/ 
Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis_for_2018.pdf 
(accessed 21 February 2018). 
8 European Commission, “Commission Presents Priority Actions 
for Responding to the Challenges of Migration”, press release 
IP/05/1500 (Brussels, 30 November 2005), europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-05-1500_en.pdf (accessed 28 March 2018). 
9 European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility, COM(2011) 743 final (Brussels, 18 November 
2011), https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/ 
files/communication_from_the_commission_1.pdf (accessed 
11 November 2018). 
bating trafficking, (3) promoting internal protection 
and the external dimension of asylum, and (4) max-
imising the positive development effects of migration 
and mobility. 
Under GAMM the EU has been seeking bilateral 
and regional cooperation with third countries since 
the early 2010s. It concluded mobility partnerships 
with countries in its neighbourhood,10 and developed 
so-called Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility 
(CAMM) with those further away. Both instruments 
contain non-binding targets and provide for support 
from the EU itself and from interested EU member 
states. CAMMs have been agreed with India, Ethiopia 
and Nigeria, mobility partnerships with nine coun-
tries, including six eastern neighbours and three Afri-
can states (Cape Verde, Morocco and Tunisia).11 The 
EU saw mobility partnerships as a possibility to reward 
partner countries for cooperation in taking back re-
jected asylum seekers and irregular migrants by grant-
ing concessions on visa liberalisation and legal immi-
gration. The instrument is regarded as having been 
largely unsuccessful, even if possible longer-term 
impacts remain to be evaluated.12 
European Agenda on Migration treats 
migration a problem rather than an 
opportunity. 
In 2015 an increase in the number of deaths of 
migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean led the 
Commission to formulate a new political framework, 
in the shape of the European Agenda on Migration. 
Most of its elements were carried over from the GAMM, 
although the Agenda no longer spoke of a positive 
connection between migration and development. 
Implementation of the Agenda on Migration priori-
tises rapid reductions in irregular migration. This 
is associated with immigration being increasingly 
regarded as a problem rather than an opportunity.13 
 
10 Steffen Angenendt, Migration, Mobilität und Entwicklung: 
EU-Mobilitätspartnerschaften als Instrument der Entwicklungs-
zusammenarbeit, SWP-Studie 25/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, November 2012). 
11 Negotiations over mobility partnerships with Egypt, 
Ghana and Senegal stalled or were abandoned. 
12 Natasja Reslow, “‘Not Everything That Counts Can Be 
Counted’: Assessing ‘Success’ of EU External Migration 
Policy”, International Migration 55, no. 6 (2017): 156–69. 
13 European Commission, “European Agenda on Migra-
tion: Commission Calls on All Parties to Sustain Progress and 
Make Further Efforts”, press release, 13 June 2017, 
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Differing Interests of the Member States 
Although the Treaty of Lisbon expanded the Commis-
sion’s powers in the area of asylum and migration, 
the member states continue to dominate the concrete 
shape of the external migration policy. But their 
interests vary strongly, conditioned by factors such as 
(colonial-era) ties to particular countries and different 
traditions in development cooperation. While histori-
cal factors lead certain northern European countries 
(Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, United Kingdom) to focus particularly on 
development needs and fighting poverty, other mem-
ber states (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain) share a more instrumental understanding. 
Strategic reasons have led the latter group to concen-
trate more on shared approaches to migration co-
operation with third countries – but only in forms 
that avoid weakening their bilateral cooperation.14  
Spain’s bilateral cooperation with Morocco since 
the 1990s is regarded as an example of fruitful long-
term cooperation in this sphere.15 The attempt to 
transpose this to the European level has been less 
successful. The European Commission has been nego-
tiating a readmission agreement with Morocco for 
fifteen years, with no success to date. A number of 
member states have insisted that the Commission 
pursue the highly controversial demand that Morocco 
take back not only its own citizens but also third-
country nationals (something not included in the 
bilateral readmission agreement with Spain).16 In a 
 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1587_en.htm 
(accessed 28 March 2018). 
14 Maurizio Carbone, “The European Union and Inter-
national Development”, in International Relations and the Euro-
pean Union, ed. Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie 
Vanhoonacker, The New European Union Series, 3rd ed., 
292–315 (308f.) (Oxford, 2017). 
15 Sergio Carrera et al., EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmis-
sion, Borders and Protection: A Model to Follow? CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe 87 (Brussels: CEPS, January 
2016), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU-Morocco%20 
Cooperation%20Liberty%20and%20Security%20in%20 
Europe.pdf (accessed 30 January 2018); Luca Lixi, Beyond 
Transactional Deals: Building Lasting Migration Partnerships in the 
Mediterranean (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 
November 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ 
beyond-transactional-deals-building-lasting-migration-
partnerships-mediterranean (accessed 31 May 2018). 
16 Leonhard den Hertog, “Funding the EU–Morocco 
‘Mobility Partnership’: Of Implementation and Competences”, 
second departure from the Spanish-Moroccan co-
operation, the EU member states also failed to signal 
any willingness to create new legal migration paths 
for Moroccan citizens. That stance contradicts the 
intention of the mobility partnership concluded in 
2013 between the EU and Morocco.17 
EU Funding and Its Political Implications 
The EU’s external migration policy operates between 
the poles of intergovernmental and supranational.18 
Because the migration-related policy instruments 
available to it are limited in their reach, the Commis-
sion seeks to exert influence principally through 
funding instruments.19 The EU’s budget for 2014 to 
2020 had been finalised before 2015’s sharp rise 
in refugee and migrant arrivals. In the course of the 
“refugee crisis” it became clear that the funds ear-
marked for migration, border protection and asylum 
policy would be nowhere near enough. The initial 
allocation for migration-related spending was there-
fore increased from €8.4 to €14.2 billion.20 Total 
spending in this field is in fact somewhat higher; 
the Commission argues that exact figures cannot by 
given because not all migration- and refugee-related 
EU spending is recorded as such. For example data 
relating to humanitarian aid is lacking.21 
 
European Journal of Migration and Law 18, no. 3 (2016): 276–
301 (accessed 30 May 2018). 
17 Natasja Reslow, “EU ‘Mobility’ Partnerships: An Initial 
Assessment of Implementation Dynamics”, Politics and 
Governance 3, no. 2 (2015): 117–28, https://cris.maastricht 
university.nl/portal/files/883283/guid-32446856-37a1-488d-
9b5d-72366c69a1ed-ASSET1.0 (accessed 27 March 2017). 
18 Tommaso Emiliani and Annika Linck, “The External 
Dimension of EU Immigration Policies: Reacting to External 
Events?” in The European Union’s Evolving External Engagement: 
Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies? ed. Chad Damro, Sieglinde 
Gstöhl and Simon Schunz (London: Routledge, 2018), 126–
50. 
19 Leonhard den Hertog, Money Talks: Mapping the Funding for 
EU External Migration Policy, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security 
in Europe 95 (Brussels: CEPS, November 2016), https:// 
www.ceps.eu/publications/money-talks-mapping-funding-eu-
external-migration-policy. 
20 Zsolt Darvas et al., EU Funds for Migration, Asylum and Inte-
gration Policies (Brussels: European Parliament, April 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/60
3828/IPOL_STU(2018)603828_EN.pdf (accessed 31 May 2018). 
21 Ibid., 14. 
The Fundaments of the EU’s External Migration Policy 
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Migration-related funds spent 
without clear shared priorities. 
In the past migration-related funds were spent 
by different Directorates General without any clear 
shared prioritisation. The strategic thrust of the 
common migration policy was shaped above all by 
Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs 
(DG HOME), even though most of the funds for migra-
tion cooperation with third countries were actually 
held by the Directorates General for Neighbourhood 
and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and for 
International Cooperation and Development (DG 
DEVCO).22 This created a strongly fragmented funding 
landscape in the area of external migration policy. 
The European Court of Auditors has in the past sharp-
ly criticised such fragmentation. With respect to the 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, it noted that the different 
migration-related funding instruments failed to 
pursue a common strategy.23 The explanation for this 
incoherence is that funds are distributed in a complex 
negotiating process involving EU institutions, mem-
ber states, international organisations and imple-
menting organisations, where it is often impossible 
to resolve conflicting goals. 
New Momentum from the 
EU Trust Fund for Africa 
The growth in numbers of arriving refugees and 
irregular migrants has greatly increased the pressure 
on the Commission to address the problems affecting 
cooperation with migration-relevant third countries. 
New and rapidly applicable instruments for funding 
refugee- and migration-related support for partner 
countries are seen as key. These include above all the 
European Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa 
created at the end of 2015, which has become a 
central component of the EU’s migration cooperation 
 
22 The EU’s current multi-annual financial framework did 
create two new funding instruments, the Asylum, Migration 
and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund 
(ISF). DG HOME can use these to fund migration policy 
actions outside the EU, as well as programmes within the 
Union. Den Hertog, Money Talks (see note 19). 
23 European Court of Auditors, EU External Migration 
Spending in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood 
Countries until 2014, special report (Luxembourg, 2016), 48, 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_09/SR_
MIGRATION_EN.pdf (accessed 5 June 2018). 
with African countries. Today the EUTF for Africa is 
one of four EU trust funds established for emergency 
external action since the possibility was created in 
the 2013 Financial Regulation.24 Originally the EUTF 
was conceived only as an instrument for humanitari-
an support for countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad 
region. But after demand arose – in connection with 
the European Agenda on Migration – to boost dia-
logue with as many migration-relevant countries as 
possible, the instrument was incrementally expanded 
to include a total of twenty-six African countries at 
the latest count.  
The objectives of the EUTF are defined in the 
Valletta Action Plan, adopted at a summit of Euro-
pean and African heads of state and government in 
Malta in November 2015.25 DG DEVCO then prepared 
a set of objectives that was adopted by EUTF’s Stra-
tegic Board jointly with the contributing states.26 But 
this list – unlike the Valletta Action Plan – does not 
prioritise the objective of improving cooperation on 
readmissions. The European Commission’s strategy 
document names the following objectives: (1) Greater 
economic and employment opportunities; (2) Strength-
 
24 The first trust fund, the Bêkou Trust Fund, was estab-
lished in July 2014 for the Central African Republic, fol-
lowed by the Madad Fund for the Syria crisis in December 
2014, the EUTF for Africa, and a trust fund for Colombia 
in December 2015. Volker Hauck, Anna Knoll and Alisa 
Herrero Cangas, EU Trust Funds: Shaping More Comprehensive 
External Action? Briefing Note 81 (Maastricht: European Centre 
for Development Policy Management [ECDPM], November 
2015), http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/Briefing_Note_81 
_EU_Trust_Funds_Africa_Migration_Knoll_Hauck_Cangas_EC
DPM_2015.pdf (accessed 20 June 2017). 
25 The objectives of the Valletta Action Plan are: (1) Ex-
ploiting development benefits of migration and addressing 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; 
(2) Improving cooperation on legal migration and mobility; 
(3) Improving protection for migrants and asylum-seekers; 
(4) Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, 
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; 
(5) Improving cooperation in return, readmission and re-
integration. European Council, Valletta Summit, 11–12 Novem-
ber 2015: Action Plan, 12 November 2015, https://www.con 
silium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf (accessed 
24 April 2017). 
26 European Commission, The European Union Emergency 
Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular 
Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa: Strategic Orientation 
Document (Brussels, 16 February 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-revised-
strategy-15022016_en.pdf (accessed 11 January 2018). 
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ening resilience of communities and in particular the 
most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced 
people; (3) Improved migration management in coun-
tries of origin, transit and destination; (4) Improved 
governance and conflict prevention. 
Despite its broad objectives, statements by Europe-
an leaders have repeatedly underlined that the main 
purpose of the EUTF is to secure the cooperation of 
third countries in reducing refugee flows and ir-
regular migration and taking back irregular migrants. 
One example of this is found in the Progress Report 
on the Implementation of the European Agenda on 
Migration published by the Commission in March 
2018, which attributes declining arrivals in Europe 
partly to EUTF measures in the area of migration 
management and security. On the other hand there 
is little in the way of evaluation of development 
initiatives.27 
 
27 European Commission, Progress Report on the Implementa-
tion of the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2018) 301 final 
(Brussels, 16 May 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20180516_progress-report-european-agenda-
migration_en.pdf (accessed 31 July 2018). 
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The EUTF has the potential to at least partially 
ameliorate the coordination problems of the external 
migration policy outlined above, by bundling the 
different funding lines in a single instrument. The 
EUTF’s special construction outside the traditionally 
cumbersome EU procurement system also permits 
funds to be spent flexibly in the African partner coun-
tries and thus to respond more adequately to dynami-
cally shifting migration flows.  
Nevertheless, the conflicts of interests and goals 
affecting the external migration policy resurface in 
the Trust Fund. The latter’s geographical and topical 
breadth creates a spectrum of implementation priori-
ties. Here the concentration on measures to improve 
control of migration increasingly endangers develop-
ment objectives. How different the effects of EUTF 
projects can be is demonstrated very clearly by a com-
parison of the migration partnerships with Ethiopia 
and Niger (see pp. 19ff.). 
Governance Structures 
Projects are approved in operational committee 
sessions for the so-called regional windows estab-
lished for the Sahel and Lake Chad region, the Horn 
of Africa, and North Africa.28 €3.2 billion of the 
€4 billion available to the EUTF until 2020 had al-
ready been committed by August 2018. The other 
approximately €800 million has already been ear-
marked by region and topic. The largest share flows 
to the Sahel and Lake Chad region (€1.5 billion), fol-
lowed by Horn of Africa (€1.1 billion), North Africa 
(€426 million) and cross-regional programmes (€145 
 
28 Clare Castillejo, The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: 
A Glimpse of the Future for EU Development Cooperation, Discus-
sion Paper 22/2016 (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwick-
lungspolitik, 2016), http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/ 
DP__22.2016.neu.pdf (accessed 10 October 2017). 
million).29 In terms of individual countries, the EUTF 
is most strongly involved in Somalia, Libya, Niger, 
Ethiopia and Mali (see map, p. 16).30 
The European Commission contributed €3.5 billion 
to the EUTF, representing almost 90 percent of its 
funds. Most of this – €2.8 billion – originates from 
the European Development Fund (EDF), which is an 
intergovernmental fund outside the EU budget ad-
ministered by DG DEVCO.31 The rest of the Commis-
sion’s contribution was reallocated from the regular 
budget (see Figure 1).32 At €440 million (or about 
10 percent of the total), the share contributed by the 
member states falls well short of the originally 
promised €1.8 billion.33 With most of the available 
funds already committed to projects, the European 
Commission has repeatedly called on the member 
states to contribute more to the Trust Fund. One alter-
native for increasing its budget would be to reallocate 
other unspent EU funds. 
 
29 European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en 
(accessed 31 July 2018). 
30 Ibid. 
31 The EDF is the funding instrument for the Cotonou 
Agreement, and is used to finance measures in the ACP 
states. To date it has been approved intergovernmentally 
but administered largely by the Commission. The idea of 
integrating the EDF into the regular budget has been dis-
cussed at intervals. It is currently unclear if and how the 
EDF  will continue after 2020. This will depend not only on 
the negotiations on the multi-annual financial framework 
but also on the Brexit process. The Cotonou Agreement also 
expires in 2020; negotiations on its successor began in Sep-
tember 2018. 
32 European Commission, EU Contributions Pledged, https:// 
ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eu_contri-
butions_pledged_1.pdf (accessed 31 July 2018). 
33 European Commission, EU MS and Other Donors Contribu-
tions: Pledges and Received Contributions, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/donor_2.pdf (accessed 
31 July 2018). 
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EUTF crucial for Libya, and thus 
attractive to otherwise sceptical 
member states. 
Apart from Greece all member states have paid 
into the EUTF, as have Switzerland and Norway (see 
Figure 2, p. 14). But in many cases the contributions 
are comparatively small: some below the €3 million 
required to acquire a vote in the Trust Fund’s stra-
tegic board and operational committee, others only 
just above. Like the partner countries and regional 
organisations, EU member states that have made less 
than the minimum contribution have only observer 
status in the organs.34 
With €160 million, Germany’s is the largest bilat-
eral contribution to the EUTF. Even if the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
is in charge, other ministries have a great interest in 
the EUTF too. Most of the German contribution origi-
nates in fact from the Foreign Ministry’s budget, 
 
34 Castillejo, The European Union Trust Fund for Africa (see 
note 28), 10. 
specifically for projects in Libya, where the Trust 
Fund represents the EU’s only option for migration 
cooperation. Projects in Libya focus on funding vol-
untary repatriation with the assistance of the Inter-
national Organisation for Migration (IOM), and train-
ing the Libyan coastguard. These projects are treated 
as a top priority because the situation in Libya and 
the central Mediterranean route remains critical. 
Such engagement is also attractive for member states 
that are otherwise sceptical towards the EU’s migra-
tion policy. For example since January 2018 the Vise-
grád states (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia) have contributed altogether €35 million to 
the EUTF.35 
 
35 European Commission, 2017 Annual Report: EU Trust Fund 
for Africa (Brussels, March 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/trust 
fundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/2017_tffa_en_web_lowres 
_final05.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
Figure 1 
EUTF: Commission Funding 
 
Source: Data from European Commission (as of 22 August 2018) 
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New Negotiating Processes between EU 
and Member States 
Decisions in the EUTF organs are generally made by 
consensus. But where a vote is necessary, each mem-
ber state that has made the minimum contribution 
has a vote, as does the Commission. A simple major-
ity is required, with the Commission holding a veto.36 
Certain member states find the Trust Fund construc-
tion problematic, because it bypasses the established 
procurement procedures and the associated commit-
tees.37 The Commission argues that this is the only 
way to respond flexibly enough to the dynamism of 
 
36 European Commission, The European Union Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa (Constitutive Agreement), https://ec.europa. 
eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/constitutive-agreement-annexe-
2015-7293-20151020_en.pdf (accessed 8 January 2018). 
37 This refers to the comitology procedure by which the 
member states oversee the Commission’s exercise of its 
implementing powers under Article 291 TFEU. EUR-Lex, 
Glossary of Summaries: Comitology, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
summary/glossary/comitology.html?locale=en (accessed 
1 February 2018). 
shifting migration flows. Projects are indeed approved 
more rapidly in the EUTF framework than via the 
European Development Fund (EDF) – although that 
does not necessarily mean that they are implemented 
more quickly.38 Most EUTF projects have been slow 
to get off the ground or are still at the planning stage, 
and it is not yet possible to systematically evaluate 
the outcomes.39 
The Trust Fund operates largely outwith parlia-
mentary oversight. In response to a string of critical 
resolutions the European Parliament has now been 
granted observer status in the Fund’s organs. But it 
remains excluded from project approval decisions in 
 
38 Sergio Carrera et al., Oversight and Management of the EU 
Trust Funds: Democratic Accountability Challenges and Promising 
Practices (Brussels: European Parliament, May 2018), 75, 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/oversight-and-management-
eu-trust-funds-democratic-accountability-challenges-and 
(accessed 31 May 2018). 
39 While the Commission issued a catalogue of nineteen 
indicators at the end of 2017, this does not yet say much 
about actual outcomes of EUTF projects. European Commis-
sion, 2017 Annual Report (see note 35), 17. 
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the operational committee,40 where most funding is 
awarded under “delegated cooperation” to selected 
organisations without public tendering.41 The Euro-
pean Parliament criticises this practice, which is also 
widely used in other funding instruments, and calls 
for EUTF projects to be put to open tender and for all 
implementation partners to be treated equally.42 
Such criticisms should be seen in the context of 
member states exploiting the Trust Fund structure to 
fund existing bilateral projects or to channel new 
projects directly to their own implementation organi-
sations. When the EUTF first began many projects 
were approved with only superficial scrutiny, but 
today the member states regularly coordinate infor-
mally before decisions are made in the operational 
committee.43 The Commission has no fundamental 
objection to this process. Very few project applica-
tions have been rejected by the operational commit-
tee.44 
40 percent of the €3.2 billion in project funds 
approved thus far have been granted to national 
implementation organisations, 26 percent to inter-
national organisations, 11 percent directly to partner 
countries and 8 percent to civil society actors. The 
biggest sum, €387 million, went to the International 
Organisation for Migration, followed by €301 million 
for the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zu-
sammenarbeit (GIZ) and €223 million for French and 
€200 million for Italian implementation organisa-
tions.45 
The large proportion of funds channelled through 
national implementation organisations contributes 
 
40 Ibid. 
41 Implementing organisations have to be certified to 
receive and administer Commission funds under “delegated 
cooperation”. European Commission, Terms of Reference for 
Pillar Assessments, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/ 
about-funding-and-procedures/audit-and-control/pillar-
assessments_en (accessed 8 January 2018). 
42 European Parliament, Report on Addressing Refugee and 
Migrant movements: The Role of EU External Action, plenary sitting 
A8-0045/2017 (Strasbourg and Brussels, 22 February 2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0045+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
(accessed 3 July 2017). 
43 Background discussions, Brussels, March 2018. 
44 Exceptions include budget aid for Chad proposed by 
France. This was rejected in December 2017 on the grounds 
that it could also be used by the armed forces. Background 
discussions, Brussels, March 2018. 
45 Background discussions (telephone), September 2018. 
to delays in project implementation, because some of 
them do not yet possess adequate capacity and must 
first establish operative structures in the partner 
countries. This has been recognised by the Commis-
sion, which complains that the national organisations 
require on average twice as long as international 
implementation organisations to begin work on 
implementing projects.46 But delays may also be 
attributable to difficult security situations or state 
interference in partner countries. 
Closer Coordination between 
EU Institutions 
The EU institutions could expand their reach through 
the EUTF for Africa. It creates an instrument for co-
operation with all African countries of origin, transit 
and first destination, which is usually divided be-
tween neighbourhood policy (North Africa) and devel-
opment cooperation (rest of Africa). The EUTF has 
without doubt improved the fragmented funding of 
the external migration policy, because the participat-
ing EU institutions have to improve their coordina-
tion. In the Commission the Directorate General for 
International Cooperation and Development (DG 
DEVCO) is responsible for implementing the EUTF. 
Its influence is visible both in the Fund’s strategy 
documents and in the implementation of most of 
the projects in the Horn of Africa. DG DEVCO has to 
coordinate with the Commission’s Cabinet and the 
Directorates General for European Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO), for Neighbour-
hood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and 
for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). The 
latter seeks to strengthen engagement in North Africa 
and where possible to tie EUTF funding to migration-
related demands, such as improved cooperation on 
repatriation of rejected asylum seekers. 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) also 
plays an increasingly important role, coordinating 
the migration partnerships funded by the Trust Fund 
and seeking to make the external migration policy 
a central element of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.47 The EEAS also oversees project im-
 
46 Background discussions, Brussels, March 2018. 
47 See for example, European External Action Service, 
Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels, 
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plementation on the ground in the partner countries. 
But the influence of the respective EU delegations 
depends strongly on strategic decisions in Brussels, 
 
2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/ 
eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). 
leaving them unable to have their usual coordinating 
impact in the respective partner countries.48 
EU officials report that the joint fact-finding mis-
sions by EU institutions are particularly useful in 
 
48 Background discussions, Brussels, March 2018. 
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improving communication about the challenges of 
the external migration policy.49 At the same time 
conflicts of interests and goals between involved EU 
institutions persist, and are reflected in the diverging 
weights they grant to the EUTF’s strategic goals. 
Differing Priorities in Implementation 
There are no binding standardised criteria for reliably 
determining the share of projects focussing on devel-
opment, security and migration.50 While the organi-
sations involved in the EUTF calculate that half the 
funds flow into development projects, Oxfam’s evalu-
ation in October 2017 came up with a figure of about 
63 percent.51 
The Commission classifies projects according to 
the four strategic objectives of the EUTF strategy (see 
Figure 3, p. 18).52 The first two of these (employment 
programmes and strengthening resilience) combine 
classic aspects of development cooperation and hu-
manitarian aid. Alongside emergency responses such 
as food aid, they also encompass long-term measures 
to improve the living conditions of refugees, inter-
nally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups. 
It is striking that the projects listed under these cat-
egories are almost all in the Horn of Africa and the 
Sahel and Lake Chad region. The Commission classi-
fies all projects in North Africa as migration manage-
ment, even if some of them also pursue development 
goals.53 
 
49 Background discussions, Brussels, March 2018. 
50 Michael A. Clemens and Hannah M. Postel, Deterring 
Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-
income Countries, CGD Policy Paper 119 (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Global Development [CGD], February 2018), 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/deterring-emigration-
foreign-aid-overview-evidence-low-income-countries.pdf 
(accessed 12 February 2018). 
51 Elise Kervyn and Raphael Shilhav, An Emergency for 
Whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Migratory Routes 
and Development Aid in Africa (Oxford: Oxfam International, 
November 2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam. 
org/files/file_attachments/bp-emergency-for-whom-eutf-
africa-migration-151117-en.pdf (accessed 16 November 2017). 
52 Figures from European Commission, EU Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa (see note 29). 
53 Oxfam points out that the project “Managing Mixed 
Migration Flows in Libya through Expanding Protection 
Space and Supporting Local Socio-economic Development”, 
for example, with a volume of €90 million, should be classed 
as development cooperation. Kervyn and Shilhav, An Emer-
This demonstrates that classification by strategic 
objective is to some extent arbitrary, and therefore 
reveals only part of the picture. The figures do never-
theless demonstrate that – alongside regional differ-
ences – the migration profiles of the partner coun-
tries also influences the shape of the EUTF projects.54 
Partner countries’ migration profiles 
influence shape of EUTF projects. 
Classical development cooperation approaches are 
especially prevalent in countries of origin for example. 
This is clearly demonstrated by the allocation of EUTF 
funds to the six participating West African states (as 
the source of half of all the arrivals registered in Italy 
in 2016 and 2017): Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, 
Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.55 Here 42 percent of the 
funds were was spent on employment programmes, 
18 percent on strengthening resilience, 21 percent 
on migration management and 19 percent on improv-
ing governance and preventing conflict.56 This con-
trasts with the distribution in transit countries like 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania and 
Niger, where the largest share goes to migration 
management (35 percent), followed by programmes 
for improving governance and preventing conflict 
(25 percent), promoting employment (22 percent), 
and strengthening resilience (17 percent).57 
 
gency for Whom? (see note 51), 30. The Commission is aware 
that the statistics contain such discrepancies and plans to 
rectify the problem. Background discussions (telephone), 
August 2018. 
54 In its progress reports on migration partnerships, for 
example, the Commission justifies measures on the basis of 
partner countries’ migration profiles. European Commission, 
Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with Third 
Countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 
471 final (Brussels, 6 September 2017), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
sites/eeas/files/20170906_fifth_progress_report_on_the_part 
nership_framework_with_third_countries_under_the_eam 
_en_0.pdf (accessed 26 October 2017). 
55 European Stability Initiative (ESI), The Italian Magnet: 
Deaths, Arrivals and Returns in the Central Mediterranean (13 
March 2018), 5, https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20core%20 
facts%20-%20The%20Italian%20Magnet%20-%2013%20 
March%202018.pdf (accessed 25 April 2018). 
56 Author’s calculations using data from European Com-
mission, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (as of August 2018) 
(see note 29). 
57 Ibid. 
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The third strategic goal of the EUTF, improving 
migration management,58 serves as a catch-all includ-
 
58 The term “migration management” is not new. It was 
introduced in the 1990s by instances like the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) in response to rising num-
bers of refugees and the weak responses of many states to 
migration flows. It was initially understood as the state’s 
ability to channel and shape the process by developing and 
ing security aspects and border protection. According 
to Oxfam more than half of all migration manage-
ment projects aim to control and contain migration, 
 
implementing migration and refugee stragegies. This inter-
pretation of migration cooperation was still very strongly 
focussed on destination countries. Today the concept is dis-
cussed more broadly, also encompassing the establishment 
of migration-related capacities in states of origin and transit. 
Figure 3 
EUTF Spending by Sector and Region 
 
Source: Data from European Commission (as of 22 August 2018) 
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often using the justification of combating people 
smuggling and human trafficking.59 Migration manage-
ment also encompasses capacity-building and training 
of security personnel (police and border guards), the 
exchange of migration data and programmes for vol-
untary repatriation from transit countries. This is also 
the context in which reforms to improve cooperation 
on readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants 
are financed, as well as the creation and enhance-
ment of identification systems and information cam-
paigns about the dangers of migration. To date this 
framework has rarely been used to promote legal 
migration.60 
These components overlap to a certain extent 
with the fourth strategic objective, namely measures 
to improve governance and prevent conflict. These 
efforts seek to promote stabilisation especially in 
fragile contexts and are supported by bilateral meas-
ures. Italy has proceeded especially strategically, 
creating its own fund for Africa through which it 
channels its contributions to the Trust Fund and 
supports other projects. More than 80 percent of the 
latter are migration management measures, backed 
up by military deployments to Libya and Niger.61 
The EU Migration Partnerships with 
Ethiopia and Niger 
In June 2016 the EU agreed migration partnerships 
with five African countries of origin and transit. 
These were funded principally through the EUTF, 
which received an additional €500 million from the 
European Development Fund (EDF) for that purpose. 
In future the migration partnerships will also be sup-
 
59 As Tuesday Reitano points out, the widespread tendency 
to conflate people smuggling and human trafficking is prob-
lematic, because countering them demands very different 
strategies. Tuesday Reitano, The Khartoum Process: A Sustainable 
Response to Human Smuggling and Trafficking? Policy Brief 93 
(Pretoria et al.: Institute for Security Studies, November 
2016), 7, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ 
policybrief93.pdf (accessed 17 January 2018). 
60 Kervyn and Shilhav, An Emergency for Whom? (see note 
51), 19. 
61 Anja Palm, Leading the Way? Italy’s External Migration 
Policies and the 2018 Elections: An Uncertain Future, IAI Commen-
taries 18 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali [IAI], February 
2018), http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom1812.pdf 
(accessed 8 June 2018). 
ported through the External Investment Plan (EIP) 
adopted in 2017.62  
In comparison to the mobility partnerships agreed 
in the early 2010s, the migration partnerships kick 
the promise of legal migration paths even further into 
the long grass. But otherwise the goals of the two 
legally non-binding cooperation instruments are simi-
lar: both seek to persuade the respective partner 
country to cooperate more closely on all aspects of 
migration, including readmission and countering 
smuggling.63 What is new is that migration partner-
ships provide for sanctions, such as suspending devel-
opment cooperation measures, where the receiving 
country is judged to be demonstrating an inadequate 
level of cooperation.64  
The example of Ethiopia illustrates the problems 
very well. Despite favourable preconditions, the EU 
migration partnership has tended to worsen rather 
than improve relations. Ethiopia played a construc-
tive role in the Khartoum Process, which was estab-
lished in 2014 for migration cooperation between 
the EU and the countries in the Horn of Africa, and 
became one of the biggest recipients of EUTF funds. 
Many projects built on existing development coopera-
 
62 This is based on “blending” private investment with 
public subsidies. It is planned to channel €3.35 billion from 
the regular EU budget and the EDF into the European Fund 
for Sustainable Development (EFSD) by 2020, to generate 
investment totalling up to €44 billion. Although the member 
states have not to date contributed additional funds to the 
EFSD, the Commission reports interest from other quarters; 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for example has an-
nounced a contribution of $50 million. The extent of planned 
support for partner countries indicates the high priority the 
Commission accords to its external migration policy. How-
ever it is questionable whether this volume of resources will 
actually be available. The member states doubt whether the 
Commission will be able to realise the leverage calculated in 
the EIP. 
63 European Commission, Establishing a New Partnership 
Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on 
Migration, COM(2016) 385 final (Strasbourg, 7 June 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-imple 
mentation-package/docs/20160607/communication_external_ 
aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf 
(accessed 10 October 2017). 
64 Natasja Reslow, “Old Wine in New Wineskins? The EU’s 
Migration Partnership Framework”, Junge Wissenschaft im 
Öffentlichen Recht, 14 December 2017, https://www.juwiss.de/ 
137-2017/ (accessed 17 May 2018). 
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tion.65 Ethiopia is also a roll-out country for the Com-
prehensive Refugee Response Frameworks (CRRF), 
which the United Nations created to develop the 
Global Compact on Refugees.66 This is a multi-stake-
holder approach designed to seek new solutions for 
persistent and acute refugee crises in collaboration 
with host countries. In this context the Ethiopian 
government agreed in 2016 to nine new measures 
to aid the almost one million refugees in the country. 
These included plans to end accommodation in camps 
and to create up to 100,000 jobs for refugees.67 The 
EUTF has supported this approach financially since 
the end of 2017.68 
But the Ethiopian government complained that the 
measures funded by the Trust Fund had little effect, 
and instead European demands for better cooperation 
in repatriating Ethiopian citizens dominated the pro-
cess.69 Ultimately Ethiopia is not only a destination 
and transit country, but also – if to a much smaller 
extent – a country of origin for mixed migration to 
the EU. Critics argue that the EU has overemphasised 
the issue of readmission to a point where it threatens 
 
65 Concord, Partnership or Conditionality? Monitoring the Migra-
tion Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa (Brussels, January 
2018), 29f., https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/01/CONCORD_EUTrustFundReport_2018_online.pdf?7c
2b17 &7c2b17 (accessed 28 February 2018). 
66 Anne Koch, “Ein Jahr nach den New Yorker Gipfeln”, 
Vereinte Nationen, 2017, no. 5, 195–200, http://www.dgvn.de/ 
fileadmin/publications/PDFs/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_2017/Heft_5 
_2017/01_Koch_5-2017_6-10-2017_web.pdf (accessed 25 Janu-
ary 2018). 
67 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, CRRF 
Ethiopia, Briefing Note (July 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/ 
reliefweb.int/files/resources/65262.pdf (accessed 27 Septem-
ber 2018). It is, however, questionable whether this target 
can be achieved, because currently too few refugees possess 
the level of education required to work in the clothing 
sector. Background discussions, Washington, D.C., March 
2018. 
68 European External Action Service, EUTF Action Document 
for the Implementation of the Horn of Africa Window: Stimulating 
Economic Opportunities and Job Creation for Refugees and Host 
Communities in Ethiopia in Support of the Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF) in Ethiopia, https://ec.europa.eu/trust 
fundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/ad_ethiopia_-_crrf_final_1.pdf 
(accessed 27 September 2018). 
69 Clare Castillejo, The EU Migration Partnership Framework: 
Time for a Rethink?, Discussion Paper 28/2017 (Bonn: Deutsch-
es Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, December 2017), https:// 
www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_28.2017.pdf (accessed 
2 January 2018). 
to undermine migration cooperation with Ethiopia 
across the board. Additionally, remittances from 
Ethiopians living abroad represent an important 
source of revenue, three times as much as total devel-
opment aid.70 The EU has delayed individual EUTF 
projects on grounds of inadequate progress on the 
readmission talks. In response the Ethiopian govern-
ment declared its intention to improve cooperation 
on this issue. It remains to be seen how those prom-
ises will turn out in practice and how migration 
cooperation altogether will develop under the new 
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.71  
The issue of readmission does not figure at all in 
the migration partnership with Niger, which is almost 
irrelevant as a country of origin. That eases coopera-
tion because the country is more dependent on devel-
opment funds than on remittances. Additionally, a 
weak government facing internal and external threats 
has a great interest in security cooperation with the 
EU.72 Niger is the largest recipient of EUTF funds 
within the Sahel and Lake Chad regional window, 
and an important partner for the EU as a transit 
country for irregular migration flows through Libya 
to the European Union.  
However, vigorous action against smuggling net-
works has problematic side-effects that the EU has 
done too little to address. Since the laws against 
people smuggling were tightened and the main routes 
to Libya closed, smugglers have switched to more 
dangerous routes – on which even more migrants 
lose their lives.73 These measures affect the informal 
“migration economy” in the Agadez region, which 
 
70 Concord, Partnership or Conditionality? (see note 65), 31. 
71 Nikolaj Nielsen, “Ethiopian Regime to Get EU Migrants’ 
Names”, EU Observer, 19 January 2018, https://euobserver.com/ 
migration/140614 (accessed 26 March 2018); Annette Weber, 
Abiy Superstar – Reformer or Revolutionary? Hope for Transforma-
tion in Ethiopia, SWP Comment 26/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018). 
72 The central government is especially weak in the north, 
where it hopes to strengthen its influence through coopera-
tion with the EU. Melanie Müller, “Migration Conflict in Niger: 
President Issoufou Dares, the North Loses”, in Profiteers of Migration? 
Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Manage-
ment, ed. Anne Koch, Annette Weber and Isabelle Werenfels, 
SWP Research Paper 4/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, July 2018), 34–43. 
73 Joe Penney, “Why More Migrants Are Dying in the 
Sahara”, New York Times, 22 August 2017, https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/migrants-dying-sahara-
niger.html (accessed 26 March 2018). 
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has long been an important staging post on the route 
to North Africa and Europe.74 But while individual 
smugglers have been taken out of circulation, the 
transnational organised crime networks continue to 
operate.75 The EU’s one-sided concentration on border 
protection in Niger also hinders freedom of movement 
in the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). This example underlines how the interest 
in clamping down on irregular migration flows 
threatens to undermine long-term goals like promot-
ing regular migration options. 
Commission tones down expectations 
of migration partnerships and shifts 
focus to ad-hoc migration dialogues. 
In the absence of rapid success, migration partner-
ships have thus far failed to meet the great political 
expectations placed upon them.76 After about a year 
the European Commission therefore lowered its 
sights, and shifted the focus in 2018 to ad-hoc migra-
tion dialogues with a series of countries of origin with 
which it aims to conclude readmission agreements.77 
The EU is not seeking new migration partnerships, 
partly because the member states have different geo-
graphical priorities:78 their preferences tend to co-
incide with the main countries of origin of arriving 
asylum seekers. 
 
74 Fransje Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand: Roadmap for 
Sustainable Migration Management in Agadez, CRU Report (The 
Hague: Clingendael, October 2017), https://www.clingendael. 
org/sites/default/files/2017-10/Roadmap_for_sustainable_ 
migration_management_Agadez.pdf (accessed 19 March 
2018). 
75 Peter Tinti and Tuesday Reitano, Migrant, Refugee, 
Smuggler, Saviour (London: Hurst, 2016), 263ff. 
76 Castillejo, EU Migration Partnership Framework (see note 
69). 
77 Alongside the five formal migration partnerships, the 
Commission’s progress reports also refer to the potential for 
cooperation with Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ghana, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan 
and Tunisia. European Commission, Fifth Progress Report (see 
note 54). 
78 Castillejo, EU Migration Partnership Framework (see note 
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Although the EUTF was initially created as an emer-
gency response, it has since acquired more fundamen-
tal significance. The new ability to combine funds 
from different policy areas could represent the begin-
nings of a new phase of the EU’s external migration 
policy. But in order to leave behind the emergency 
response logic and start to address the long-term mi-
gration challenges, the coherence of the EU’s external 
migration policy needs to be improved. Ideally the 
EU’s actions should not only be free of contradictions 
but also create positive synergies. Given the diverging 
goals this can never quite be achieved, however. 
Instead the external migration policy needs viable 
compromises based on effectiveness, legitimacy and 
sustainability. 
Effectiveness 
In migration policy there is frequently a tension be-
tween political goals and their implementation.79 That 
can also be observed in the actions pursued under 
the EU’s external migration policy since the “refugee 
crisis” of 2015. In that sense the EUTF is an outcome 
of the great political pressure on the European Com-
mission to rapidly institute measures to stabilise 
partner countries and address the causes of irregular 
migration and forced displacement. While the Trust 
Fund has flexibilised and accelerated the decision-
 
79 In three dimensions: Firstly, on the discursive level 
between the rhetoric of political leaders and the shape of 
concrete migration policy (policy gap); secondly, with respect 
to the actual realisation of declared policy objectives (imple-
mentation gap); thirdly, in terms of the effects of particular 
measures on migration flows (efficacy gap). Mathias Czaika 
and Hein de Haas, “The Effectiveness of Immigration Poli-
cies”, Population and Development Review 39, no. 3 (2013): 487–
508, https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-effectiveness-
of-immigration-policies (accessed 28 February 2018). 
making process for approving projects, this says 
nothing about the quality of implementation.80 
Central actors in the EU tend to concentrate above 
all on measures in the areas of migration manage-
ment and security policy. These are often easier to 
implement than development concepts, because the 
targets and cooperation partners are easier to define.81 
The objectives of migration- and refugee-related 
development cooperation, on the other hand, fre-
quently remain vague; UN Sustainable Development 
Goal 10.7 for example calls on states to “facilitate 
orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility 
of people”. To date there is not even an indicator to 
measure the success of such an effort. The objective 
pursued by refugee-related development cooperation 
is even more problematic. The expectation that ap-
propriate action could reduce the causes of refugee 
movements and irregular migration will – at least in 
the short term – not come to fruition.82 
It is for example questionable whether develop-
ment aid–driven employment programmes for young 
people actually help to stem migration flows at source. 
Research to date suggests that such programmes have 
little effect on emigration rates.83 Of course develop-
ment cooperation can promote economic develop-
ment, but in poor countries this (alongside many other 
factors) actually tends to cause emigration rates to 
rise. Moreover, economic motives cannot be viewed in 
 
80 Carrera et al., Oversight and Management of the EU Trust 
Funds (see note 38), 75. 
81 Daniel Wunderlich, “Implementing EU External Migra-
tion Policy: Security-driven by Default?” Comparative European 
Politics 11, no. 4 (2013): 406–27. 
82 Steffen Angenendt and Anne Koch, “Fluchtursachen-
bekämpfung: Ein entwicklungspolitisches Mantra ohne 
Inhalt?” in Ausblick 2016: Begriffe und Realitäten internationaler 
Politik, ed. Volker Perthes (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, January 2016), 41–44. 
83 Clemens and Postel, Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid 
(see note 50). 
Goals of a Coherent External 
Migration Policy 
 Legitimacy 
 SWP Berlin 
 From Exception to Rule – the EU Trust Fund for Africa 
 December 2018 
 23 
isolation from other motives for emigration. Given 
the great complexity of such decisions, their deter-
mining factors should only be considered in their 
totality.84 
EU could achieve progress by 
concretising reduction of “root 
causes” and breaking down into 
realistic sub-goals. 
The most difficult matter of all is tackling the “root 
causes” of involuntary movements through develop-
ment cooperation and other measures. Given the 
international community’s very limited success in 
addressing fragile statehood and the growing number 
of violent conflicts, more honesty is needed in the 
effectiveness discussion.85 Here the EU could promote 
progress by concretising the vague objective of re-
ducing the causes of involuntary movements and 
breaking it down into realistic sub-goals whose imple-
mentation can be measured. Merely quantifying the 
targets, as the European Commission does on the 
EUTF website, is not terribly convincing.86 It would be 
more important to monitor the effect of Trust Fund 
measures on target groups from the outset through 
reliable methods, also in order to enable correction of 
undesirable developments. 
Additionally, conventional assumptions about the 
connections between migration, forced displacment 
and development need to be questioned and the 
knowledge base expanded.87 The Research and Evi-
dence Facility in the EUTF’s Horn of Africa regional 
window represents a good start.88 Evidence-based 
 
84 Steffen Angenendt, Charles Martin-Shields and Benja-
min Schraven, More Development – More Migration? The “Migra-
tion Hump” and Its Significance for Development Policy Co-operation 
with Sub-Saharan Africa, SWP Comment 40/2017 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2017). 
85 Clemens and Postel, Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid 
(see note 50). See also World Bank and United Nations, 
Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent 
Conflict (Washington, D.C., and New York, March 2018), 
https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org (accessed 20 March 2018). 
86 European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 
(see note 29). 
87 OECD, Addressing Forced Displacement through Development 
Planning and Co-operation: Guidance for Donor Policy Makers and 
Practitioners, OECD Development Policy Tools (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2017). 
88 EUTF Research and Evidence Facility, Migration and 
Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Desk Review and Proposal for 
policy to reduce the causes of involuntary movements 
is only possible if monitoring and research are con-
ducted systematically in all three EUTF regional win-
dows and the insights gained are fed back into the 
operational committee and strategic board. 
Legitimacy 
Within the EU the legitimacy of external migration 
policy depends in the first place on whether it is 
subject to democratic control. To date the European 
Parliament has no oversight over EUTF decisions 
and the procurement process is not adequately trans-
parent. As a result national implementation organi-
sations are sometimes chosen purely on grounds of 
proportionality rather than competence. For the 
multi-annual financial framework 2021 to 2027 the 
Commission proposes integrating the EUTF into the 
regular budget.89 That would be consistent in the sense 
that the Fund’s creation was justified in terms of re-
sponding to an emergency but the underlying chal-
lenges are long-term. Merging the Fund into the regu-
lar budget would also grant the European Parliament 
greater oversight in this area. 
Only a partnership-led approach 
based on compromise has any 
prospect of success. 
Whether the EU’s external migration policy is 
perceived as legitimate in the (African) partner coun-
tries is a second decisive aspect. Only a partnership-
led approach based on a balance of interests has any 
prospect of success. Financial incentives alone cannot 
create functioning migration partnerships. The Euro-
pean Union’s financial possibilities cannot grow as 
quickly as the expectations of the numerous migra-
tion-relevant partner countries. The importance of 
investments by other actors in Africa is also growing: 
China in particular places fewer political demands 
on partners than the European Union. Ultimately co-
operation with the EU is only worthwhile if it is not 
 
Research (London and Nairobi, 15 March 2017), https://www. 
soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/file120035.pdf 
(accessed 1 March 2018). 
89 European Commission, EU Budget for the Future: the 
Neighbourhood and the World, Fact Sheet (Brussels, 2 May 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ 
budget-proposals-neighbourhood-world-may2018_en.pdf 
(accessed 2 May 2018). 
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only financially attractive but also serves the strategic 
interests of the respective partner countries.90 
Sustainability 
An external evaluation of the European Development 
Fund (EDF) commissioned by the Commission ques-
tions whether the measures funded by the EUTF are 
sustainable. It suggests that project funding decisions 
pay too little attention to the interests of the partner 
countries, unlike in longer-established development 
instruments like the EDF.91 Instead, it notes, priority 
is given to European interests and the desire to get 
projects approved quickly, while the preconditions 
for successful implementation tend to be neglected. 
Another external evaluation also raises the question 
of whether the EUTF is cost-effective.92 
Even if such criticisms certainly do not apply to all 
EUTF projects, an increasingly instrumental under-
standing of development cooperation does emerge: 
one in which the primary objective is not to improve 
living conditions but to reduce refugee movements 
and irregular migration. In the case of certain projects 
in the North Africa regional window it is not clear 
whether they even meet the OECD criteria for public 
development spending. The Commission would like 
to include measures to improve migration manage-
ment – including those in the security sector – in its 
official development assistance (ODA) figures.93 But 
 
90 Koch, Weber and Werenfels, “Diversity of Cooperation 
Contexts as a Challenge for the EU”, in Profiteers of Migration? 
ed. Koch, Weber and Werenfels (see note 72), 66–73. 
91 European Commission, External Evaluation of the 11th 
European Development Fund (EDF) (2014–mid 2017): Final Report 
(Brussels, June 2017), 9, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/ 
devco/files/edf-evaluation-final-report_en.pdf (accessed 
18 January 2018). The European Court of Auditors published 
a performance audit in December 2018, whose findings have 
not been considered in this research paper. European Court 
of Auditors, European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: 
Flexible But Lacking Focus, special report (Luxembourg, 2018), 
32, https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did 
=48342 (accessed 12 December 2018). 
92 Carrera et al., Oversight and Management of the EU Trust 
Funds (see note 38). 
93 OECD, DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics: 
Proposed New Purpose Code For “Facilitation of Orderly, Safe, Regular 
and Responsible Migration and Mobility” (Paris, 30 November 
2017), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay 
documentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT(2017)23/REV1&doc 
security activities represent a grey area of ODA eli-
gibility, where only the supply of military equipment 
and services is explicitly excluded. If the ODA criteria 
are further watered down, the danger grows that 
development funding in the EUTF framework could 
be strongly focussed on migration control in transit 
countries. That would potentially be the detriment 
of the EU’s engagement in countries of origin and in 
persistent refugee and internal displacement situa-
tions such as in the Horn of Africa. 
Even if most member states are pressing for short-
term results from the EU’s external migration policy, 
the methods of development cooperation continue 
to offer orientation for sustainable use of funds. Espe-
cially in the case of cooperation with authoritarian 
regimes, the principles of effective and conflict-sensi-
tive development cooperation are important in order 
to avoid unintended side-effects and reduce risks 
(do no harm). Broader leeway exists in the case of co-
operation with countries that possess comparably 
legitimate and functioning institutions. In these cases 
migration- and refugee-related cooperation should 
be integrated into national development plans and 
tied to credible incentives for cooperation.
 
Language=En (accessed 19 December 2017); Kervyn and 
Shilhav, An Emergency for Whom? (see note 51), 16. 
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The European Agenda on Migration of 2015 created 
a new framework for the EU’s common migration 
and asylum policy. Whereas attempts to reform the 
sharing of responsibility for accepting refugees within 
the EU have to date proven fruitless, the orientation 
of the external migration policy is less contested. The 
EU has developed a number of initiatives in this area, 
among which the EUTF for Africa stands out. Although 
initially conceived as a temporary funding instrument 
for emergencies, it has the potential to become the 
norm for the external migration policy. It can serve as 
a model for systematically integrating the EU’s migra-
tion interests into its external policy. 
At the time of writing most of the EUTF’s funds 
had already been committed to projects. The question 
of whether further EU funds will be reallocated and 
whether the member states increase their contribu-
tions will depend above all on the Fund’s future ori-
entation, which is currently under discussion, There 
are different ideas about this both among the EU 
institutions and between the relevant ministries of 
the German government. Domestic political pressures 
place a premium on measures that directly stem ir-
regular migration, primarily in North Africa. From 
the development perspective the crux is to extend 
support to the less proximate countries of destination 
and origin. The future shape of the EUTF must take 
into account interactions with three important Euro-
pean and international processes. These are the 
negotiations over the next multi-annual financial 
framework, the implementation of the Global Com-
pacts for Migration and Refugees and the future of 
European-African cooperation.  
The substantive and institutional place of the ex-
ternal migration policy in the European Union’s 
multi-annual financial framework for 2021 to 2027 
is currently being negotiated. Following the EUTF 
model, the Commission has proposed merging most 
of the hitherto parallel budget lines into a single 
external policy funding instrument, the Neighbour-
hood, Development and International Cooperation 
Instrument (NDICI).94 Under the Commission’s pro-
posal it would contain €90 billion, €10 billion of 
which would serve as an “emerging challenges and 
priorities cushion”. These funds would be flexibly 
available for the EU’s external migration policy,95 
enabling the EUTF to be integrated into the regular 
budget and expanding the oversight of the European 
Parliament. In that respect it would also be sensible 
for the parliament to consolidate its control of spend-
ing in the field of external policy in a single commit-
tee.96 
It is certainly conceivable that this idea will be 
rejected, leaving the EUTF outside the budget, while 
Brexit places further question marks over the pro-
posed financing of the external policy funding instru-
ment.97 There are also signs of conflict between the 
Commission and the member states, with the latter 
calling for a separate instrument to “combat illegal 
migration” in the Conclusions of the European Coun-
cil at the end of June 2018.98 
Restricting the external migration policy to stem-
ming irregular migration flows is hardly going to be 
compatible with the objectives of the Global Com-
 
94 Also including the European Development Fund, which 
is currently outside the budget. European Commission, EU 
Budget for the Future (see note 89). 
95 Pauline Veron and Anna Knoll, “Three Ingredients for a 
Future-proof Funding for Migration”, ECDPM (blog), 30 April 
2018, http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/three-ingredients-
future-proof-funding-migration/ (accessed 2 May 2018). 
96 Clare Castillejo et al., The European Union’s Next Multi-
annual Financial Framework: Prospects and Challenges for EU Devel-
opment Cooperation (European Think Tanks Group, March 
2018). 
97 Ibid., 19. 
98 European Council, European Council Conclusions (Brussels, 
28 June 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ 
press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/ 
(accessed 30 July 2018). 
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pacts for Migration and Refugees. While the two 
Compacts, which were adopted at the United Nations 
in December 2018, are not legally binding, they will 
form an important framework and point of reference 
for the EU’s future external migration policy. The 
main objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees 
include strengthening the self-reliance of refugees 
and alleviating the burden on the main destination 
countries. At the same time the Compact underlines 
the need for evidence-based policy. That appears all 
the more important where development cooperation 
is expected to reduce the causes of voluntary and 
involuntary movements. Here the EU could supply an 
important contribution by starting to differentiate 
more strongly between the two, and defining objec-
tives more precisely. One guideline here is the Global 
Compact for Migration, which seeks to steer irregular 
migration into regular forms. That can benefit coun-
tries of origin and destination as well as migrants 
themselves, on top of promoting sustainable develop-
ment. Neither of the Compacts propose geographical 
restrictions; on the contrary, they are explicitly in-
tended to be universal. 
One obvious weakness of EU migration policy to 
date is that it does little to promote legal migration 
opportunities within Africa and to Europe. That could 
change in the future development of the EUTF and 
in the upcoming EU budget, if for example the pro-
motion of legal migration is understood as integral 
component of migration cooperation and partner 
countries are supported to create labour migration 
programmes. Great potential lies in the strengthening 
of transnational training partnerships, which appear 
especially attractive to all EU countries with skilled 
labour shortages.99 Another important aspect is inter-
nal mobility in Africa, because the African Union 
and the African regional economic communities all 
promote freedom of movement, not least to promote 
economic integration.100 
 
99 Training partnerships would train skilled workers for 
the needs of both country of origin and country of destina-
tion. Steffen Angenendt and Anne Koch, Global Migration 
Governance and Mixed Flows: Implications for Development-centred 
Policies, SWP Research Paper 8/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, June 2017). 
100 Elizabeth Collett and Aliyyah Ahad, EU Migration 
Partnerships. A Work in Progress (Brussels: Migration Policy 
Institute, December 2017), 36f., https://www.migration 
policy.org/research/eu-migration-partnerships-work-progress 
(accessed 2 January 2018). 
Herein lies a starting point for the current nego-
tiations about a new Joint Africa-EU Strategy and a 
successor to the Cotonou Agreement between the EU 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.101 
The German government should emphasise that the 
migration dialogue with African countries needs to 
be embedded in this broader development agenda. 
Corresponding initiatives by the member states, such 
as the “Marshall Plan with Africa” developed by the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, should be connected more closely 
with the EU instruments in order to maximise the 
impact. In the long term, future migration and refu-
gee movements can only be addressed in a sustain-
able manner if the EU’s member states and institu-
tions pursue coordinated strategies and transparent 
objectives. 
 
101 James Mackie, Martin Ronceray and Lidet Tadesse, 
Challenges for Africa-Europe Relations. A Chance to Get It Right 
(Maastricht and Brussels: ECDPM, January 2018), http:// 
ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/Challenges-2018-A-Chance-
To-Get-it-Right-Mackie-Ronceray-Tadesse.pdf (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
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Abbreviations 
ACP African, Caribbean, Pacific 
CAMM Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Frameworks 
DG DEVCO Directorate General for International 
Cooperation and Development (European 
Commission) 
DG ECHO Directorate General for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid (European 
Commission) 
DG HOME Directorate General for Migration and 
Home Affairs (European Commission) 
DG NEAR Directorate General for Neighbourhood 
and Enlargement Negotiations (European 
Commission) 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EDF European Development Fund 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EFSD European Fund for Sustainable Development 
EIP External Investment Plan 
ESI European Stability Initiative 
EUTF European Union Emergency Trust Fund 
(for Africa) 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
NDICI Neighbourhood, Development and 
International Cooperation Instrument 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
 
 
  
  
